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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

HAVE HAD LONG CONFERENCE WITH PRIME MINISTER, HO CHI MINH AND HE IMPRESSES ME AS SENSIBLE, WELL BALANCED, POLITICALLY Minded individual. HIS DEMANDS ARE FEW AND SIMPLE. NAMELY LIMITED INDEPENDENCE, LIBERATION FROM FRENCH RULE, RIGHT TO LIVE AS FREE PEOPLE IN FAMILY OF NATIONS AND LASTLY RIGHT TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH OUTSIDE WORLD.

HE STATED THAT FOR MANY YEARS MISSIONARY WORK OF PROPAGANDA WITHIN PARTY, TRAINING OF YOUTH AND PREPARATION FOR THIS DAY HAS MADE THEM READY NOT NECESSARILY FOR COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE BUT AT LEAST THE PRIVILEGE OF DATING FOR THEIR IDEALS. FROM WHAT I HAVE SEEN THESE PEOPLE MEAN BUSINESS AND ARE AFRAID THAT FRENCH WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THEM. FOR THAT MATTER WE WILL ALL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THEM. FRENCH ARE BEGINNING TO RECOGNIZE THIS FACT AND ARE GOING TO BE BIG ABOUT IT BY OFFERING VIET MINH TERMS FOR THEIR INDEPENDENCE. ON OTHER HAND VIET MINH IS SMART ENOUGH TO SEE THROUGH MACHIAVELLIAN ATTITUDE FRENCH HERE ESPECIALLY SAINTENY AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY REFUSED TO DEAL WITH HIM.

VIETNAMESE ARE IN UNIQUE ADVANTAGE. OUR POSITION IN AS MUCH AS JAPS HAVE GIVEN THEM INDEPENDENCE SO THEY CONSIDER THEMSELVES FREE OF ANY SOVEREIGN POWER AND THIS INCLUDES FRENCH WHO HAVE BEEN HIDING BEHIND JAP BLAIRS, VICIOUS TACTICS AND PASSING THEMSELVES OFF AS FRIENDS OF VIETNAM. VIET MINH HAS
FULL CONTROL OF SITUATION NOT ONLY IN HAND IF WE RULE OF 3 PROVINCES, THEIR ORGANIZATION IS WELL WITH PROGRAM CLEAR AND THEIR DEMANDS ON OUTSIDE WORLD FLED. THEY ASK THAT THEY BE PERMITTED TRAVEL PARTICULARLY TO AMERICA PARTICULARLY FOR EDUCATION PURPOSES AND THAT AMERICA SEND TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO HELP THEM ESTABLISH THOSE FEW INDUSTRIES THAT CHINA IS CAPABLE OF EXPLOITING. PRIME MINISTER PARTICULARLY ASKED ME THAT AMERICANS EXERCISE SOME CONTROL OVER CHINESE OCCUPATION FORCES AND THAT CHINESE PURCHASE MATERIALS AND FOOD RATHER THAN REQUISITIONING IT DURING OCCUPATION PERIOD. FURTHERMORE HE POINTED OUT AND THIS I HAVE CONFIRMED FROM OTHER SOURCES JAP AND FRENCH THAT DUE TO FLOOD THIS YEAR FAMINE IS IMMINENT AND SHOULD CHINESE DEPEND ON HOW CHINESE FOR THEIR SUBSISTENCE DURING OCCUPATION PERIOD THEY WILL ALL STARVE, PLUS CREATING SITUATION WHERE JAPANESE WILL BE FORCED TO RAGE WAR UPON CHINESE TO PROTECT HIS LIVELIHOOD AND FAMILY. JAPANESE CELEBRATING JAPANESE INDEPENDENCE DAY TOMORROW WITH HIGH SOLEMN MASS BY CATHOLICS AND SPECIAL RITUAL BY BUDDHISTS.

Letter from Ho Chi Minh to President Harry S. Truman, 28 February 1946

Ho Chi Minh, “Letter from Ho Chi Minh to President Harry S. Truman,” 28 February 1946. Courtesy of National Archives
RECOMMENDATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AND TURKEY

ADDRESS
OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
DELIVERED
BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RECOMMENDING ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AND TURKEY

MARCH 12, 1947.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and ordered to be printed

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States:

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress.

The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.

The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.

I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government.

Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and peace-loving country has suffered invasion, 4 years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife.

When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads,
RECOMMENDATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AND TURKEY

consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the executive and legislative branches of the Government must work together.

This is a serious course upon which we embark.

I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious.

The United States contributed $341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace.

The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than one-tenth of 1 percent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died.

We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation. Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.

I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 12, 1947.
“Come South,” Propaganda Poster, August 5, 1954

FOR RELEASE 1 P.M., FRIDAY, June 1st.


It is a genuine pleasure to be here today at this vital Conference on the future of Vietnam, and America's stake in that new nation, sponsored by the American Friends of Vietnam, an organization of which I am proud to be a member. Your meeting today at a time when political events concerning Vietnam are approaching a climax, both in that country and in our own Congress, is most timely. Your topic and deliberations, which emphasize the promise of the future more than the failures of the past, are most constructive. I can assure you that the Congress of the United States will give considerable weight to your findings and recommendations; and I extend to all of you who have made the effort to participate in this Conference my congratulations and best wishes.

It is an ironic and tragic fact that this Conference is being held at a time when the news about Vietnam has virtually disappeared from the front pages of the American press, and the American people have all but forgotten the tiny nation for which we are in large measure responsible. This decline in public attention is due, I believe, to three factors:

(1) First, it is due in part to the amazing success of President Diem in meeting firmly and with determination the major political and economic crises which had heretofore continually plagued Vietnam. (I shall say more about this point later, for it deserves more consideration from all Americans interested in the future of Asia.)

(2) Secondly, it is due in part to the traditional role of American journalism, including readers as well as writers, to be more interested in crises than in accomplishments,
to give more space to the threat of wars than the need for works, and to write larger headlines on the sensational omissions of the past than the creative missions of the future.

(3) Third and finally, our neglect of Vietnam is the result of one of the most serious weaknesses that has hampered the long-range effectiveness of American foreign policy over the past several years -- and that is the over emphasis upon our role as "volunteer fire department" for the world. Whenever and wherever fire breaks out -- in Indo-China, in the Middle East, in Guatemala, in Cyprus, in the Formosan Straits -- our firemen rush in, wheeling up all their heavy equipment, and resorting to every known method of containing and extinguishing the blaze. The crowd gathers -- the usually successful efforts of our able volunteers are heartily applauded -- and then the firemen rush off to the next conflagration, leaving the grateful but still stunned inhabitants to clean up the rubble, pick up the pieces and rebuild their homes with whatever resources are available.

The role, to be sure, is a necessary one; but it is not the only role to be played, and the others cannot be ignored. A volunteer fire department halts, but rarely prevents, fires. It repels but rarely rebuilds; it meets the problems of the present but not of the future. And while we are devoting our attention to the Communist arson in Korea, there is smoldering in Indo-China; we turn our efforts to Indo-China until the alarm sounds in Algeria -- and so it goes.

Of course Vietnam is not completely forgotten by our policy-makers today -- I could not in honesty make such a charge and the facts would easily refute it -- but the unfortunate truth of the matter is that, in my opinion, Vietnam would be receiving more attention from our Congress and Administration, and greater assistance under our aid programs, if it were in imminent danger of Communist invasion or revolution. Like
those peoples of Latin America and Africa whom we have very nearly overlooked in the past decade, the Vietnamese may find that their devotion to the cause of democracy, and their success in reducing the strength of local Communist groups, have had the ironic effect of reducing American support. Yet the need for that support has in no way been reduced. (I hope it will not be necessary for the Diem Government -- or this organization -- to subsidize the growth of the South Vietnam Communist Party in order to focus American attention on that nation’s critical needs!)

No one contends that we should now rush all our fire-fighting equipment to Vietnam, ignoring the Middle East or any other part of the world. But neither should we conclude that the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China removed that area from the list of important areas of United States foreign policy. Let us briefly consider exactly what is "America’s Stake in Vietnam":

(1) **First**, Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those whose security would be threatened if the Red Tide of Communism overflowed into Vietnam. In the past, our policy-makers have sometimes issued contradictory statements on this point -- but the long history of Chinese invasions of Southeast Asia being stopped by Vietnamese warriors should have removed all doubt on this subject.

Moreover, the independence of Free Vietnam is crucial to the free world in fields other than the military. Her economy is essential to the economy of all of Southeast Asia; and her political liberty is an inspiration to those seeking to obtain or maintain their liberty in all parts of Asia -- and indeed the world. The fundamental tenets of this nation’s
foreign policy, in short, depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese nation.

(2) Secondly, Vietnam represents a proving ground of democracy in Asia. However we may choose to ignore it or deprecate it, the rising prestige and influence of Communist China in Asia are unchallengable facts. Vietnam represents the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experiment fails, if some one million refugees have fled the totalitarianism of the North only to find neither freedom nor security in the South, then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians. The United States is directly responsible for this experiment -- it is playing an important role in the laboratory where it is being conducted. We cannot afford to permit that experiment to fail.

(3) Third and in somewhat similar fashion, Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future. As French influence in the political, economic and military spheres has declined in Vietnam, American influence has steadily grown. This is our offspring -- we cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs. And if it falls victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence -- Communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest -- then the United States, with some justification, will be held responsible; and our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low.

(4) Fourth and finally, America's stake in Vietnam, in her strength and in her security, is a very selfish one -- for it can be measured, in the last analysis, in terms of American lives and American dollars. It is now well known that we were at one time on the brink of
war in Indo-China -- a war which could well have been more costly, more exhausting and less conclusive than any war we have ever known. The threat of such war is not now altogether removed from the horizon. Military weakness, political instability or economic failure in the new state of Vietnam could change almost overnight the apparent security which has increasingly characterized that area under the leadership of Premier Diem.

And the key position of Vietnam in Southeast Asia, as already discussed, makes inevitable the involvement of this nation's security in any new outbreak of trouble.

It is these four points, in my opinion, that represent America's stake in Vietnamese security. And before we look to the future, let us stop to review what the Diem Government has already accomplished by way of increasing that security. Most striking of all, perhaps, has been the rehabilitation of more than 3/4 of a million refugees from the North. For these courageous people dedicated to the free way of life, approximately 45,000 houses have been constructed, 2,500 wells dug. 100 schools established and dozens of medical centers and maternity homes provided.

Equally impressive has been the increased solidarity and stability of the Government, the elimination of rebellious sects and the taking of the first vital steps toward true democracy. Where once colonialism and Communism struggled for supremacy, a free and independent republic has been proclaimed, recognized by over 40 countries of the free world. Where once a playboy emperor ruled from a distant shore, a constituent assembly has been elected.

Social and economic reforms have likewise been remarkable. The living conditions of the peasants have been vastly improved, the wastelands have been cultivated, and a wider ownership of the land is gradually being encouraged. Farm cooperatives and farmer loans have modernized an outmoded agricultural economy; and a tremendous dam in the center of the country has made possible the irrigation of a vast area previously uncultivated.
Legislation for better labor relations, health protection, working conditions and wages has been completed under the leadership of President Diem.

Finally, the Vietnamese army -- now fighting for its own homeland and not its colonial masters -- has increased tremendously in both quality and quantity. General O'Daniel can tell you more about these accomplishments.

But the responsibility of the United States for Vietnam does not conclude, obviously, with a review of what has been accomplished thus far with our help. Much more needs to be done; much more, in fact, than we have been doing up to now. Military alliances in Southeast Asia are necessary but not enough. Atomic superiority and the development of new ultimate weapons are not enough. Informational and propaganda activities, warning of the evils of Communism and the blessings of the American way of life, are not enough in a country where concepts of free enterprise and capitalism are meaningless, where poverty and hunger are not enemies across the 17th parallel but enemies within their midst. As Ambassador Chuong has recently said: “People cannot be expected to fight for the Free World unless they have their own freedom to defend, their freedom from foreign domination as well as freedom from misery, oppression, corruption.”

I shall not attempt to set forth the details of the type of aid program this nation should offer the Vietnamese -- for it is not the details of that program that are as important as the spirit with which it is offered and the objectives it seeks to accomplish. We should not attempt to buy the friendship of the Vietnamese. Nor can we win their hearts by making them dependent upon our handouts. What we must offer them is a revolution -- a political, economic and social revolution far superior to anything the Communists can offer -- far more peaceful, far more democratic and far more locally controlled. Such
a Revolution will require much from the United States and much from Vietnam. We must 
supply capital to replace that drained by the centuries of colonial exploitation; technicians 
to train those handicapped by deliberate policies of illiteracy; guidance to assist a nation 
taking those first feeble steps toward the complexities of a republican form of government. 
We must assist the inspiring growth of Viamese democracy and economy, including the 
complete integration of those refugees who gave up their homes and their belongings to 
seek freedom. We must provide military assistance to rebuild the new Viamese Army, 
which every day faces the growing peril of Vietminh Armies across the border.

And finally, in the councils of the world, we must never permit any diplomatic action 
adverse to this, one of the youngest members of the family of nations -- and I include in 
that injunction a plea that the United States never give its approval to the early nationwide 
elections called for by the Geneva Agreement of 1954. Neither the United States nor Free 
Vietnam was a party to that agreement -- and neither the United States nor Free Vietnam 
is ever going to be a party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance, urged 
upon us by those who have already broken their own pledges under the Agreement they now 
seek to enforce.

All this and more we can offer Free Vietnam, as it passes through the present period of 
transition on its way to a new era -- an era of pride and independence, an era of democratic 
and economic growth -- an era which, when contrasted with the long years of colonial op-
pression, will truly represent a political, social and economic revolution.

This is the revolution we can, we should, we must offer to the people of Vietnam -- not 
as charity, not as a business proposition, not as a political maneuver, nor simply to enlist 
them as soldiers against Communism or as chattels of American foreign policy -- but a
revolution of their own making, for their own welfare, and for the security of freedom everywhere. The Communists offer them another kind of revolution, glittering and seductive in its superficial appeal. The choice between the two can be made only by the Vietnamese people themselves. But in these times of trial and burden, true friendships stand out. As Premier Diem recently wrote a great friend of Vietnam, Senator Mansfield, "It is only in winter that you can tell which trees are evergreen." And I am confident that if this nation demonstrates that it has not forgotten the people of Vietnam, the people of Vietnam will demonstrate that they have not forgotten us.
TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 11, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 52

TO: The Secretary of State

The President today reviewed the report of the Vietnam Task Force, entitled "Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam." Subject to amendments or revisions which he may wish to make after providing opportunity for a further discussion at the next meeting of the National Security Council, now scheduled for May 19, the President has made the following decisions on the basis of this report:

1. The U. S. objective and concept of operations stated in the report are approved: to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam; to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society, and to initiate, on an accelerated basis, a series of mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic, psychological and covert character designed to achieve this objective.

2. The approval given for specific military actions by the President at the National Security Council meeting on April 29, 1961, is confirmed.

3. Additional actions listed at pages 4 and 5 of the Task Force Report are authorized, with the objective of meeting the increased security threat resulting from the new situation along the frontier between Laos and Vietnam. In particular, the President directs an assessment of the military utility of a further increase in G. V. N. forces from 170,000 to 200,000, together with an assessment of the parallel political and fiscal implications.

4. The President directs full examination by the Defense Department, under the guidance of the Director of the continuing Task Force on Vietnam, of the size and composition of forces which would be desirable in the case of a possible commitment of U. S. forces to Vietnam. The diplomatic setting within which this action might be taken should also be examined.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Committee Report
R.G. 41602, Sec. 373 and 500 of 1961
by MED, NAS, Dec. 4/9/76

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5. The U.S. will seek to increase the confidence of President Diem and his government in the United States by a series of actions and messages relating to the trip of Vice President Johnson. The U.S. will attempt to strengthen President Diem's popular support within Vietnam by reappraisal and negotiation, under the direction of Ambassador Nolting. Ambassador Nolting is also requested to recommend any necessary reorganization of the Country Team for these purposes.

6. The U.S. will negotiate in appropriate ways to improve Vietnam's relationship with other countries, especially Cambodia, and its standing in world opinion.

7. The Ambassador is authorized to begin negotiations looking toward a new bilateral arrangement with Vietnam, but no firm commitment will be made to such an arrangement without further review by the President.

8. The U.S. will undertake economic programs in Vietnam with a view to both short term immediate impact and a contribution to the longer range economic viability of the country, and the specific actions proposed on pages 12 and 13 of the Task Force Report are authorized.

9. The U.S. will strengthen its efforts in the psychological field as recommended on pages 14 and 15 of the Task Force Report.

10. The program for covert actions outlined on page 15 of the Task Force Report is approved.

11. These decisions will be supported by appropriate budgetary action, but the President reserves judgment on the levels of funding proposed on pages 15 and 16 of the Task Force Report and in the funding annex.

12. Finally, the President approves the continuation of a special Task Force on Vietnam, established in and directed by the Department of State under Sterling J. Cottrell as Director, and Chalmers B. Wood as Executive Officer.

Information copies to:
Defense
CIA
USIA
Treasury
BOB
ICA

McGeorge Bundy
TOP SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 115

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Defoliant Operations in Viet Nam

The President has approved the recommendation of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense to participate in a selective and carefully controlled joint program of defoliant operations in Viet Nam starting with the clearance of key routes and proceeding thereafter to food denial only if the most careful basis of resettlement and alternative food supply has been created. Operations in Zone D and the border areas shall not be undertaken until there are realistic possibilities of immediate military exploitation.

The President further agreed that there should be careful prior consideration and authorization by Washington of any plans developed by CINCPAC and the country team under this authority before such plans are executed.

McGeorge Bundy

Information Copies to:

The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, U. S. Information Agency
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Military Representative of the President

cc: Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. McC. Bundy
B. Smith/C. Johnson
Robert Johnson
NSC Files

TREATY
banning nuclear weapon tests
in the atmosphere, in outer
space and under water

The Governments of the United States of America, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to
as the "Original Parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest
possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete
disarmament under strict international control in accordance
with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an
end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the
production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including
nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to
continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end
to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive
substances,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to
prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear
weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at
any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including
outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or
high seas; or
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have caused the Seal of the United States of America to be hereunto affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this tenth day of October in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred sixty-three and of the Independence of the United States of America eighty-eighth.

By the President:

Dean Rusk

Secretary of State
Letter from Iowa Soldier during the Vietnam War, September 6, 1967 (pg.1)

Orderly Room
Co B, 504th MP BN
CAMP HOLLOWAY
Pleiku, "wet" Central Highlands
Republic of Viet Nam
Wednesday pm, 6 September 1967

Dear Mrs Greene:

We had some excitement last Wednesday night. We were sitting around reading and writing at 8:30 when the company area shook with an explosion. Someone yelled, "Incoming mortars!" The alert siren in the motor pool was turned on, and grabbing weapons, flack jackets and steel pots, we scrambled for our bunker. After five minutes we noticed that we seemed to be the only company on alert. In ten minutes the word came down that it was a false alarm; two guys in a 179th Aviation Company hooch (150 yds from our hooch) were taking apart a M79 grenade round to convert it to a salt shaker when it exploded. One guy lost a hand and part of his leg, and the other caught a piece in his side. Such a waste and a tragedy! They won't even get a purple heart.

We have an unusual new vehicle in our company. It is one of six new V100 Commando Armored Cars recently delivered to Vietnam. The all-around seven-ton weight armor makes the crew immune to small-arms fire, hand grenades and many other explosive devices. The hull is designed with no vertical surface (like the CAIRO, to deflect large projectiles). It doesn't have to stick to solid ground either. When the crew "buttons up" the hatches, the car can navigate calm bodies of water. It can go 60 mph under ideal conditions, and even if all four of its big tires should lose pressure, the thing will still top 40 mph on a good road. We are very happy to have the car for escort of important convoys through unsecured areas.

Do you remember my mention of a fellow named Perraro being accidently shot in the leg? Well that poor guy is the unluckiest person I've ever met. He finally got on his feet and back to duty after six weeks and what happens - he gets thrown through the windshield in a jeep wreck. He now has a broken leg, taped wrists and stitches all over his chin, and won't be able to take the cast off till November. The common consensus is, "Give the poor guy a hardship discharge before he kills himself." His nickname is "combat."

Headquarters personnel of this company got a new platoon SGT last month in the person of Supply Sergeant McMullen who is affectionately called "The Buzzard" because of his stopped back, big ears and hooked nose. He insisted on separating us in our living quarters by job category so for last two weeks all the supply and personnel clerks have been swinging hammers and hauling lumber. Our new hooch is really nice - 40x20' with 8' walls and large general purpose tent covering our A-frame supports to keep out the weather. While we were at it I built wooden shelves to fit inside of my metal wall locker. It is now perfectly organized for the first time since I entered into this military existence.

This last weekend elections were held in town. Extra MP's were brought up from the 4th Div at Dragon Hill to handle any enemy-inspired disturbances. The
only thing so far was that a convoy was ambushed Saturday night on Hwy 19 near Hang Giang Pass with 8 killed and 10 wounded. I rode through Pleiku, Sunday morning as shotgun for our mail clerk. The streets were filled with ARVN soldiers and people in their colorful holiday clothes. I saw many buildings flying the red and yellow Vietnamese flags, and there were long lines of voters in front of several. There were election posters all over, and everyone seemed to be having a good time. As of tonight there hasn’t been any incidents downtown. "Maybe" we are making some progress over here.

Two of our guys just returned from R&R in Bangkok, and for a couple of days straight we’ve been hearing of the Wow girls (photos to prove it) and "lovely nights." I’m not going on R&R; I don’t think I could say "No" once I got there. Besides, the couple of hundred I’d spend is going for a new typewriter when I get home.

I’m sure it would amuse you to see me now. Our new platoon sergeant doesn’t mind mustaches, and I’ve been cultivating one for last 2½ weeks – really like "un hombre malo."

After much changing of mind it now seems that our whole company will move to Camp Schmidt on ther side of Pleiku by the end of this month. Everyone hates the idea of moving.

You know, I’ve been here so long (and become really fond of one of the little Vietnamese mamasans) that it’s going to take some time to readjust to the shining qualities of American girls ... like maybe a whole hour or two. But seriously, Vietnamese girls are very charming!!!!!!

Look forward to hearing from you soon, and getting all the latest news. I’m sorry I am so very late in answering –

Sincerely,

Jim

PS. We now have a new CO and ISC, and it seems that life is pretty near 100% different than it was here just a short 50 days ago. Speaking of days, I now have only 169 to go – SHORT ! ! !
“Vietnamese Army’s Seven Commandments” Propaganda Poster, May 28, 1956

“Army Behavior Poster (7 Panels to set) - Vietnamese Army’s Seven Commandments,” U.S. Information Agency, 28 May 1956. Courtesy of National Archives
North Viet-Nam's Agricultural Failures Create Serious Food Problem (Cont'd.)

The article then stated that of the 220,000 hectares that were to have been cleared in the first two years of the plan, only 160,000 were cleared. Thus the DRV fell behind the 1961 per capita average.

The recent demotion of the Minister of Agriculture, Nguyen Xuan Yen, to the position of Minister of State Farms, also reflected the poor performance of this segment of North Viet-Nam's economy in 1962. This change and Yen's replacement was announced at a January 7 meeting of the National Assembly's Standing Committee. The Minister had been a high ranking DRV official in the agricultural ministry since 1947 and held the ministerial portfolio since 1954. His demotion at this time, together with other shifts in agricultural leadership, undoubtedly reflect top-level displeasure at the poor showing of DRV agriculture during the last few years.

In a radio broadcast in December 1962, then Minister Yen explained at length how well the people of the North had done in the field of agriculture in spite of the many natural calamities which struck during the year. Though the severe droughts and typhoons during 1962 were a major factor in holding back agricultural production, his remarks, viewed in light of his demotion, appeared to be an attempt to draw attention away from human failings, including his own.

In February, this year, Hanoi also revealed that a worsening drought has already caused crop damage in many areas. In a strongly worded order on anti-drought measures broadcast from the Communist party secretariat on February 1, authorities in a "number of localities" were charged with administrative and leadership failures as a result of having "fallen into passivity when the drought dragged on seriously". The statement further revealed that peasants in "a number of areas" had become so discouraged over persistant drought conditions that they had given up the struggle and left the farms for other employment.

Whether caused by weather or managerial bungling, another poor crop would not only add to food problems but would further exacerbate existing peasant dissatisfaction with the rural cooperatives. It is quite apparent that in a country not well suited for agricultural production, the expansion of agriculture beyond the efficiently arable land and capacity of the people has been plagued by the law of diminishing returns.

These agricultural failures in North Viet-Nam as well as similar failures in Communist China should continue to serve as a lesson to the primarily agricultural oriented developing areas that the so called "efficient" and "systematic" Communist methods are not always successful nor worthy of emulation.
North Viet-Nam's Agricultural Failures Create Serious Food Problem

North Viet-Nam's failure to achieve any significant advances in agricultural production over the past three years — in the face of its rapidly expanding population — has created serious food problems which Hanoi obviously views with concern. Figures released by the DRV in late December and early January indicated clearly that the DRV's agriculture fell behind both planned norms and the population growth in North Viet-Nam. While the DRV claimed that the gross value of agricultural production in 1962 increased 4.3 percent (as against 8.9 percent in 1961), the increase in the amount of food available to the population was considerably less.

The Viet-Nam News Agency (VNA), for example, reported that the total production of paddy rice for 1962 was 5,600,000 metric tons; only 70,000 more than last year, a percentage increase of about 1.2 percent. This increase is slight compared to the DRV's population growth of 2-3 percent a year.

Recent Hanoi birth control pleas through the media have reflected the DRV food problem. On January 10, 1963, the daily Thoi Ngo called for greater efforts in birth control during 1963, and made it clear that some efforts had already been exerted in this direction. The article referred to talks by medical cadres on methods for preventing conception, "experimental units" where birth control has been carried out, and courses conducted by labor unions. It then argued against the largeness of the family by stressing the plight of young widows with several children, numerous work hours lost because of children's illnesses or confinement, and the general burden of maintaining a large family. It failed, naturally, to mention the primary reason for the increased interest in birth control — the disproportionate increase of population over agricultural production.

In the same vein, the Communist party organ Nhan Dan admitted a year ago that even if the rice target of the five year plan were met, the DRV could not produce enough rice to meet the needs of its rising population. Then, on January 21, 1963, this same paper again stressed DRV concern over the expanding population and revealed that measures taken to date were inadequate. It noted:

In five years of agricultural development, 1961-1965, the North will, it is planned, clear 550,000 additional hectares of land. Because of our rapid increase in population — it is estimated that the northern population will reach 19 million persons by the end of 1965 — we will be able to maintain the 1961 average per capita acreage only if we achieve the above norm of land clearance.
September 14, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

SUBJECT: World Reaction to Developments in Viet-Nam

Some sympathy for the U. S. dilemma in Viet-Nam has emerged in the last week, particularly in Western Europe, but most comment is still critical of U. S. policies. There is virtually no sympathy for the Diem regime, except in South Korea and the Philippines where officials see Diem as the only available anti-communist bulwark. This applies to some extent to Thailand as well.

De Gaulle's oral intervention was criticized widely in France except by the papers traditionally supporting him. It drew only limited comment elsewhere.

FAR EAST

The situation in Viet-Nam continues to receive major news play but editorial comment has slackened during past week. Available comment, both media and official, has tended to focus on the question of continued U. S. support for the Diem regime. Reference to the possibility of a neutralized Viet-Nam, as implied by De Gaulle, has been limited. Buddhist groups in Thailand, Burma and Cambodia continue to agitate against GVN treatment of Buddhists. Peking and Hanoi reports now reflect belief that U. S. may eventually replace Diem but that this will not affect the war.

WESTERN EUROPE

Viet-Nam crisis remains the subject of continuing and extensive news coverage and considerable editorial comment in the West European press. Comment has been almost totally critical of the Diem family regime. Though not uncritical of some American moves, the majority of non-communist papers display considerable sympathy for the U. S. dilemma, and have offered few concrete suggestions for remedies. Recent news coverage has played up U. S. alleged participation in anti-Diem moves but editorial comment on this subject is not yet available.
NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA

Crisis continues receive substantial news play though volume has dwindled somewhat since the wave of reaction following the imposition of martial law and attack on pagodas on August 21. Scattered editorial and backgrounder in media are relentlessly critical of the Diem regime and continue to view its removal as the only answer if the war against the Viet Cong is to be won. Criticism of U.S. policy has softened somewhat, most editorial comment viewing U.S. as faced with necessity of dealing with "difficult and corrupt" regime with which it has little sympathy while responding to the longer range necessity of fighting the Viet Cong. De Gaulle proposal for unification has drawn little attention. Three leading Indian newspapers split sharply, one opposing and two supporting it.

AFRICA

Only light and scattered coverage of Viet-Nam issue. Except for Algeria, very little comment specifically condemns the U.S. Some Africans view South Vietnamese events in terms of Catholic oppression during the Middle Ages. Neutralization of the country is offered as a possible solution in Tunisia's Jeune Afrique.

LATIN AMERICA

South Vietnam situation receiving moderate news treatment. Editorial comment scarcely. News treatment often appeared under headlines which point up the disagreement between Washington and Saigon.

CONCLUSION:

Virtually no sympathy or support for Diem regime except as noted above. Some sympathy for U.S. dilemma in Viet-Nam — I would expect this note of sympathy and understanding to increase unless new and violent acts of suppression occur in South Viet-Nam.

I conclude that the degree of the dilemma and the complexity of the issues involved is almost as well understood abroad as it is in Washington.

Edward R. Murrow
"Aggression From the North," U.S Information Agency, 23 April 1965. Courtesy of National Archives
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT INFORMATION

March 17, 1975

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

SUBJECT: Saigon CIA Station Chief's Assessment of the Current Military Situation in South Vietnam

The CIA Station Chief in Saigon has just completed an appraisal of the current military situation there following the outbreak of North Vietnamese attacks on March 10.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President outlining the key points of this assessment.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

DECLASSIFIED
R.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines CIA Access

SECRET

By [Redacted], NARA, Date 218100

“Memorandum Regarding the Saigon Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Station Chief's Assessment of the Current Military Situation in South Vietnam,” Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 17 March 1975. Courtesy of National Archives
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

URGENT INFORMATION

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Saigon CIA Station Chief’s Assessment of the Current Military Situation in South Vietnam

The CIA Station Chief in Saigon has just completed an appraisal of the current military situation there following the outbreak of North Vietnamese attacks on March 10.

The key points in this analysis are as follows:

-- Developments of the past two weeks in South Vietnam leave no doubt that the Government (GVN) is facing a "general offensive" as traditionally defined to include coordinated, countrywide attacks by divisional-sized units aimed at bringing about a decisive change in the military and political situation.

-- Elements of two strategic reserve divisions recently have moved from North Vietnam into the South and possibly other elements are on the way.

-- The GVN as a result of U.S. aid cutbacks is in the position of having to defend itself with far fewer resources than ever before, a problem which has been seriously exacerbated by the latest round of fighting.

-- The drawdown on GVN ammunition and POL stocks will soon be staggering.

-- In their own guidance documents and briefings the Communists are describing 1975 as the year of decision in which large scale military activity will bring about decisive changes in the military-political balance.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
MSC Memo, 11/24/91, State Dept. Guidelines, Cia Review 1/00
By Editor, NARA, Date 1/11/00

“Memorandum Regarding the Saigon Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Station Chief’s Assessment of the Current Military Situation in South Vietnam,” Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 17 March 1975. Courtesy of National Archives
Moreover, Communist propaganda and secret documents clearly attribute the improvements in Communist fortunes to developments in the U.S. North Vietnam’s authoritative Party journal "Hoc Tap" recently interpreted the cutback in U.S. aid to South Vietnam as a sign of U.S. impotence and unwillingness to reenter the Indochina conflict and indicated that this had figured centrally in Hanoi’s decision to escalate the fighting in 1975.

In summary, South Vietnam is in deep trouble because of North Vietnamese determination to bring about a military solution. Unless the present trends are reversed, within the next few months the very existence of an independent non-Communist South Vietnam will be at stake. The emergency will not be like that now faced in Phnom Penh, because South Vietnamese leadership is stronger and geographic factors are more favorable. However, the ultimate outcome is hardly in doubt because South Vietnam cannot survive without American military aid as long as North Vietnam’s war-making capacity is unimpaired and supported by the Soviet Union and China.